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PATENTS FOR INTANGIBLE INVENTIONS IN AUSTRALIA  







An issue currently attracting attention in a number of jurisdictions is the patentability 
of ‘pure’ business methods, which are business methods that do not involve a physical 
aspect. This issue was dealt with recently in Australia by the Full Court of the Federal 
Court which considered the patentability of a method of protecting an asset from the 




The question of whether a purely intangible invention is or ought to be patentable is a 
conceptually-challenging conundrum for intellectual property lawyers. It is a question 
that draws opposition from those who believe these patents award an unjustifiable 
monopoly and prevent ordinary people doing ordinary things such as making use of 
the law in areas such as taxation or commerce. It is a difficult concept that strikes at 
the heart of issues such as what an invention is, how it differs from a mere idea and 
what aims patent law is supposed to achieve. Unfortunately, it must be resolved in the 
absence of foresight as to what technological advances may bring in the future and in 
accordance with constraints imposed by the existing law. 
 
The question arises when considering the patentability of ‘pure’ business methods. A 
business method can broadly be described as a method of operating any aspect of an 
economic enterprise. A ‘pure’ business method is a means of carrying out commercial 
activities which lacks a physical manifestation or effect, in that it is not implemented 
in, or does not cause an alteration to, a physical device such as a computer.  
 
Whether an intangible invention is patentable remains a contentious question in a 
number of jurisdictions. It is a question that was not resolved in the United States 
Federal Circuit decision of State Street Bank & Trust Co v Signature Financial 
Group.1 It was considered in respect of a ‘non-machine-implemented’ process by the 
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office in Ex parte Carl A Lundgren.2 It has been at issue in the recent debates as to 
whether tax minimisation schemes are patentable in the United States.3 It was also at 
                                                 
* BA LLB (Hons) UQ LLM QUT, Associate Lecturer, Law School, Queensland University of 
Technology. 
1 149 F 3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); 525 U.S. 1093 (1999) (denying certiorari); Christopher L Ogden, 
‘Patentability of Algorithms After State Street Bank: The Death of the Physicality Requirement’ (2000) 
82 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc’y 728. 
2 76 USPQ 2d 1385 (Board of Patent Appeals & Interferences 2005). 
3 United States House of Representatives Joint Committee on Taxation, Background and Issues 
Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice (JCX-31-06), July 12, 2006; Andrew A. Schwartz, ‘The Patent 
Office Meets the Poison Pill: Why Legal Methods Cannot Be Patented’ (2007) 20(2) Harvard Journal 
of Law and Technology (draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=937398). 
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issue before the Court of Appeal in the United Kingdom in Aerotel Ltd v Telco 
Holdings Ltd.4 
 
The Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia has for the first time considered the 
patentability of a pure business method in Grant v Commissioner of Patents.5 Mr 
Grant’s invention is described as an asset protection method. It is a legal structure 
designed to allow a person to protect an asset from the claims of creditors. It involves 
creating a trust, the person making a gift of money to the trust, the trustee lending a 
sum of money to the person, and the trustee securing the loan by taking a charge over 
the asset. The aim of the method is that the trustee, by virtue of having taken a charge 
over the asset, would thereby have priority over other creditors of the person in whose 
favour debts may arise later in time. The patent involves reserving the ability to apply 
certain aspects of the law in a particular way to achieve a useful result to one 
individual. 
 
For the purposes of determining whether this method is patentable subject matter, it is 
not necessary to understand in workings of the trust arrangement. It is sufficient to 
know that the invention can be categorised as an intangible legal business method, 
being a sequence of steps that a lawyer might advise a client to follow to achieve a 
particular result. The key issue to understand is that this is a purely intangible method 
that does not produce, operate or alter a physical object or produce a physically-
observable effect. 
 
After an examination hearing, the Deputy Commissioner of Patents held that the 
invention is not patentable subject matter. This decision was upheld on appeal by 
Branson J, a single judge of the Federal Court of Australia. A further appeal was 
brought by Mr Grant before the Full Court of the Federal Court. In a controversial 
decision, the Full Court unanimously rejected the appeal, and in doing so, introduced 
a new test that in order to be patentable, an invention must disclose a physically-
observable effect. 
 
In what follows, the questions of whether the existing law requires that a patent must 
have a physical aspect in order to be patentable and whether the Full Court’s decision 
was correct are addressed. The examination of these issues is divided into two parts. 
In part 1, it is suggested that there is no requirement in Australian law that an 
invention disclose a physical aspect in order to be patentable. In part 2, the different 
reasons for not upholding the validity of the patent given in the Federal Court and by 
the Deputy Commissioner of Patents are analysed and the view that the patent should 
not have been revoked on the ground that it was not patentable subject matter is put 
forward. Possible approaches that the High Court of Australia might take in relation to 
the matter should Mr Grant obtain special leave to challenge the Federal Court’s 
decision on appeal are then discussed. 
 
II PHYSICALITY AND THE MANNER OF MANUFACTURE TEST 
 
                                                 
4 [2006] EWCA Civ 1371. Text of judgment is available at www.bailii.org. 
5 [2006] FCAFC 120. Australian judgments are available at www.austlii.edu.au. 
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To properly determine whether the Full Court of the Federal Court was correct in 
holding that Australian law requires an invention to disclose a physical effect in order 
to be patentable subject matter requires an examination of the existing law. 
 
The view taken by the courts in Australia is that it has long been accepted that 
methods of calculation, discoveries, abstract ideas, laws of nature, scientific theories, 
intellectual information, and theoretical business schemes are not patentable unless 
they are applied to a new and useful purpose.6 
 
Australia is one of a number of countries that still uses the manner of manufacture test 
to determine the scope of patentable subject matter. The requirement stems from 
section 6 of the now repealed Statute of Monopolies 16237 which rendered void all 
monopolies, provided that the invalidating provisions of the statute: 
 
shall not extend to any letters patents and grants of privilege for the term of 
fourteen years or under, hereafter to be made of the sole working or making of 
any manner of new manufactures within this realm, to the true and first 
inventor and inventors of such manufactures, which others at the time of 
making such letters patents and grants shall not use, so as also they be not 
contrary to the law or mischievous to the State by raising prices of 
commodities at home, or hurt of trade, or generally inconvenient. (Modern 
spelling) 
 
The test does not expressly require that an invention be of industrial application or 
technologically implemented.  
 
The manner of manufacture requirement forms part of section 18 of the Patents Act 
1990 (Cth). Section 18 requires that for a standard patent, an invention be new, novel, 
a manner of manufacture within the meaning of section 6 of the Statute of 
Monopolies, involve an inventive step, be useful and not have been used in secret.8 
The requirements for an innovation patent are similar, the difference being that the 
requirement for an inventive step is replaced by the need for an innovative step.9 The 
courts have held that the heads of validity in section 18 are to be considered 
separately and the issues that relate to one head are not applicable to another,10 so it is 
important not to confuse issues of novelty, inventiveness, or utility with the manner of 
manufacture concept.  
 
                                                 
6 Much reliance in this regard has been placed on the oft cited J Lahore, ‘Computers and the Law: The 
Protection of Intellectual Property’ (1978) 9 Federal Law Review 15, 22 – 3, which was approved in 
CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 122 ALR 417, 447. 
7 21 Jam 1, Ch 3 (1623) (Eng). 
8 Section 18 and schedule 1 (which defines ‘invention’) Patents Act 1990 (Cth). 
9 Section 18(1A) Patents Act 1990 (Cth). An innovation patent is a second tier patent that is intended to 
provide less expensive monopoly rights for lower level or incremental inventions for a shorter period 
than for a standard patent. Currently, the term of protection for an innovation patent is 8 years, rather 
than the 20 year term of a standard patent. 
10 Lockwood Security Products Pty Ltd v Doric Products Pty Ltd [2004] HCA 58, [43] – [46]; CCOM v 
Jiejing (1994) 122 ALR 417, 446 – 447. 
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Mr Grant applied for an innovation patent. An innovation patent is granted after the 
application passes a formalities check, rather than a substantive examination.11 After 
an innovation patent has been granted the patentee may request that a substantive 
examination be conducted to have the innovation patent certified, which is needed 
before the patent can be enforced.12 Mr Grant was awarded a patent, but it was 
revoked by the Deputy Commissioner of Patents after a substantive examination had 
been conducted. 
 
How the antiquated terminology of the manner of manufacture test from a now 
repealed English statute is to be applied in modern times was explained by the High 
Court of Australia in the watershed case of National Research Development 
Corporation v Commissioner of Patents13 (‘NRDC’). 
 
The case was an appeal to the High Court challenging the rejection of a patent 
application by the Deputy Commissioner of Patents. The application was for a method 
of applying a herbicidal composition of known chemicals to certain broad-leafed 
crops to kill weeds but not harm the crops. This patent application was for a method 
of treating crops using a mixture of known chemicals, rather than for a physical 
product being the mixture of chemicals. 
 
The High Court in a unanimous decision (Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ), said that 
the expression, manner of manufacture, is not to be interpreted literally and warned 
against limiting the meaning of the phrase by attempting to precisely define the term, 
‘manufacture’. Instead, the court said that the expression is a general title which is to 
be interpreted in accordance with the purpose of the Statute of Monopolies and in line 
with common law principles established for the application of that purpose. In answer 
to the question of whether the process claimed was a ‘manner of new manufacture’ 
the court said that it was a mistake to restate the question in the form: ‘Is this a 
manner (or kind) of manufacture?’ The court said that this causes problems as it tends 
to limit one’s thinking to goods produced by hand or machine, which is too restrictive 
an approach to take. Rather, the court said that the correct question to ask is: 
 
Is this a proper subject of letters patent according to the principles which have 
been developed for the application of section 6 of the Statute of Monopolies?14 
 
That is, the court indicated that the approach to take is one that is consistent with the 
principles that can be observed from a reading of the case law on the matter.  
 
The court made it clear that a manner of manufacture need not result in the production 
of a physical article. In the course of its judgment, the court referred to what had 
become known as Morton’s rule. In Re GEC's Application,15 Morton J, while 
disclaiming the intention of laying down any hard and fast rule applicable to all cases, 
put forward the proposition that: 
 
                                                 
11 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 52. What a formalities check should entail is set out in the Patents 
Regulations 1991 (Cth). 
12 Patents Act 1990 (Cth) s 101A, 101E, 120(1A). 
13 [1959] HCA 67; (1959) 102 CLR 252. 
14 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 269. 
15 (1942) 60 RPC 1. 
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a method or process is a manner of manufacture if it (a) results in the 
production of some vendible product or (b) improves or restores to its former 
condition a vendible product or (c) has the effect of preserving from 
deterioration some vendible product to which it is applied.16 
 
The High Court adopted this definition with reservation, accepting the requirement 
that a patentable invention be a vendible product, but rejecting any idea that Morton 
J’s rule was conclusive and thereby limited the concept of a product to the three 
activities of production, improvement or restoration, and preventing deterioration. In 
laying down a test for determining whether an invention is a vendible product, the 
court set out the following requirements. It said that Morton J’s rule may be accepted 
as long as the term, product is taken to cover every end produced and vendible is 
taken to point only to the requirement of utility in practical affairs.17 
 
The court said that an invention must be an artificially-created state of affairs that is 
of economic significance, meaning that its value to the country must be in the field of 
economic endeavour, and that it must have ‘an industrial, commercial or trading 
character’. Further, it must offer some advantage that is material in the sense that it 
must be part of the ‘useful arts’ rather than the ‘fine arts’.18 The fine arts are normally 
taken to include the products of human intellectual activity which seek expression 
through aesthetic creations such as painting, sculpture and music.19 
 
The High Court held that the method of selectively exterminating weeds created an 
artificial state of affairs, in the form of a greater crop yield, which had a remarkable 
advantage in the area of agriculture, which is an area of economic endeavour. The 
court did not see any reason to hold that agricultural and horticultural process were a 
class of invention excluded from patentability20 and held that the application disclosed 
a patentable invention since it claimed: 
 
a new process for ridding crop areas of certain kinds of weeds, not by applying 
chemicals the properties of which were formerly well understood so that the 
idea of using them for this purpose involved no inventive step, but by applying 
chemicals which formerly were supposed not to be useful for this kind of 
purpose at all.21 
 
The High Court observed that the term, manner of manufacture, is a dynamic concept 
whose meaning has evolved over time. It said that the principles are to be applied 
flexibly, as technological developments and inventions are excitingly unpredictable 
and accordingly, the concept of patentability must be able to accommodate inventions 
that have not yet been envisaged.22 This is consistent with the approach used in the 
United States.23 
                                                 
16 (1942) 60 RPC 1, 4 cited in NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 272. 
17 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 276. 
18 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 275. 
19 Australian Patent Office Manual of Practice and Procedures Volume 2 - National, para 2.9.2.4 (‘Fine 
Arts’). 
20 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 277 – 279. 
21 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 264. 
22 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 271; Grant v Commissioner of Patents [2006] FCAFC 120, [7] – [8]. 




One question the High Court clearly left open in NRDC was the principal issue in 
dispute in Grant v Commissioner of Patents, being whether an intangible invention is 
patentable. In the words of the High Court: 
 
But a question which appears still to await final decision is whether it is 
enough that a process produces a useful result or whether it is necessary that 
some physical thing is either brought into existence or so affected as the better 
to serve man’s purposes.24 
 
It can be seen throughout its judgment that the court seemed to be at pains to avoid 
importing any requirement that there must be some physical result from the working 
of a patent. This would appear to be a deliberate strategy in keeping with the idea that 
the concept of patentability must be able to respond flexibly to inventions not yet 
envisioned. It never once stated that an invention must involve a physical article and it 
did state that Morton’s rule was useful, but only to the extent that ‘what is meant by a 
“product” in relation to a process is only something in which the new and useful 
effect may be observed’.25 The High Court said: 
 
But the judgment in the Elton and Leda Chemicals Case (1957) RPC 267 is 
also valuable for present purposes by reason of a suggestion which it contains 
as to the true office of the word “product” in such contexts as that of 
Morton J.’s “rule”. The learned judge said: “There has been no question, at 
any rate since before the year 1800, that the expression ‘manner of 
manufacture’ in the Statute of James I must be construed in the sense of 
including a practice of making as well as the means of making and the product 
of making. It has thus been appreciated that, although an inventor may use no 
newly devised mechanism, nor produce a new substance, none the less he 
may, by providing some new and useful effect, appropriate for himself a 
patent monopoly in such improved result by covering the mode or manner by 
means of which his result is secured. Seeing that the promise which he offers 
is some new and useful effect, there must of necessity be some product 
whereby the validity of his promise can be tested” (1957) RPC, at pp 268, 269  
 
Notwithstanding the use of the word “making”, which but for the context 
might have been taken to indicate the narrow view that an article or material 
must result if a process is to be a “manufacture”, the tenor of the passage 
seems to be that what is meant by a “product” in relation to a process is only 
something in which the new and useful effect may be observed.26 
 
However, immediately following this passage, the High Court made one ambiguous 
statement, which may be the basis for some confusion regarding a physicality 
requirement, when it went as far as to say: 
 
Sufficient authority has been cited to show that the “something” need not be a 
“thing” in the sense of an article; it may be any physical phenomenon in which 
                                                 
24 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 270. 
25 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 276. 
26 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 275 – 276. 
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the effect, be it creation or merely alteration, may be observed: a building (for 
example), a tract or stratum of land, an explosion, an electrical oscillation.27 
 
This statement makes the court’s position ambiguous because it is unclear what is 
meant by the use of the word ‘may’. If the word ‘may’ is used in an exclusive sense to 
demonstrate the form an invention must take, it would indicate that an invention must 
have a physical aspect to be patentable.  
 
The preferable view would be that the court was giving one example of the form 
patentable subject matter might take, being a form consistent with Morton’s rule. That 
is, the court was saying: there are many forms that patentable subject matter may take; 
it may be any physical phenomenon, as was described in Morton’s rule; or it might be 
something other than a physical phenomenon. That this is the better view is supported 
by the very next sentence of the judgment. 
 
It is, we think, only by understanding the word “product” as covering every 
end produced, and treating the word “vendible” as pointing only to the 
requirement of utility in practical affairs, that the language of Morton J’s 
“rule” may be accepted as wide enough to convey the broad idea which the 
long line of decisions on the subject has shown to be comprehended by the 
Statute.28 
 
Here we have a clear attempt by the court to explain that a product is every useful end 
produced without associating that end result with the word, ‘physical’. Given that this 
passage follows directly after the court’s discussion of Morton’s rule and the court 
expressly said that those rules by themselves were far too restrictive, it would seem 
fair to suggest that the High Court was merely giving an example of what might be 
patentable and not imposing a requirement that an invention have a physical aspect. 
This would also be consistent with the statement made by the court that the 
physicality issue was unresolved. 
 
The High Court’s decision in NRDC has been considered in a number of Federal 
Court decisions. The Full Court of the Federal Court in CCOM v Jiejing29 considered 
whether a Chinese language word processor was patentable subject matter. In 
upholding the validity of the patent the court noted that a physical aspect was inherent 
in the invention in NRDC,30 and that a number of computer software inventions 
considered in previous cases31 had physical aspects,32 but did not say that the manner 
of manufacture test requires that a computer program be embodied in a physical 
device.33 
 
Heerey J, a member of the Full Court in CCOM v Jiejing and Grant v Commissioner 
of Patents, while sitting as a single judge in the Federal Court in Welcome Real-Time 
                                                 
27 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 276. 
28 NRDC (1959) 102 CLR 252, 276. 
29 (1994) 122 ALR 417. 
30 CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 122 ALR 417, 446. 
31 International Business Machines Corporation’s Application (1980) FSR 564; International Business 
Machines Corporation v Commissioner of Patents (1991) 33 FCR 218; Burroughs Corporation 
(Perkin's) Application (1974) RPC 147. 
32 CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 122 ALR 417, 446, 448 – 449. 
33 CCOM v Jiejing (1994) 122 ALR 417, 450. 
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v Catuity,34 noted that the High Court had not determined the issue of whether an 
invention requires a physical aspect to be patentable. 
 
The invention in Welcome Real-Time v Catuity involved a process and device for the 
operation of smart cards in connection with traders’ loyalty programs. The smart 
cards contained microprocessors or chips able to receive and store information. The 
problem with the smart cards was that they had a small memory capacity, which could 
only store loyalty-points information in relation to a limited number of traders, being 
less than the number of traders who use loyalty programs. The invention used an 
ingenious method to overcome this problem by dynamically storing loyalty-points 
information on the cards, so they could be used across thousands of merchants each 
operating their own proprietary loyalty programs, rather than the cards being 
preconfigured to recognise a limited number of traders. 
 
The invention involved both a method and a device. It did not involve the creation of 
a physically observable product, but it did involve a method operating to alter the 
state of the smart cards, which are physical objects. Since the invention involved an 
alteration of a physical product, this is not what could be described as a pure business 
method patent. It instead was a business method which involved an interaction with a 
physical device. His Honour found that this method and device were patentable.35 
 
On the question of whether a business method could be patentable, His Honour did 
not regard the law as necessarily requiring that there be a physically observable effect. 
He said: 
 
What is disclosed by the Patent is not a business method, in the sense of a 
particular method or scheme for carrying on a business ... Rather, the Patent is 
for a method and a device, involving components such as smart cards and POS 
terminals, in a business; and not just one business but an infinite range of retail 
businesses. The respondents’ argument for distinguishing CCOM - the 
supposed lack of “physically observable effect” - turns on an expression not 
found in CCOM itself. Nor does such a concept form part of the Full Court’s 
reasoning. In any event, to the extent that “physically observable effect” is 
required (and I do not accept that this is necessarily so) it is to be found in the 
writing of new information to the Behaviour file and the printing of the 
coupon.36 (original emphasis) 
 
In the course of judgment, Heerey J stated that he had found the US Court of Appeals 
decision in State Street Bank & Trust Co v Signature Financial Group persuasive, 
despite the United States having a different test for what is patentable subject matter.37 
According to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, an invention will be patentable subject matter if it involves some practical 
application and ‘it produces a useful, concrete and tangible result.’ The court 
determined that business methods were to be subject to the same legal requirements 
for patentability that applied to any other process or method and that they were not to 
be treated as a special class of process not worthy of patent protection.  
                                                 
34 [2001] FCA 445. 
35 Welcome Real-Time v Catuity [2001] FCA 445, [127]. 
36 Welcome Real-Time v Catuity [2001] FCA 445, [128]. 
37 Welcome Real-Time v Catuity [2001] FCA 445, [129]. 
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Some commentators have attempted to discern from these cases the existence of what 
they describe as a technicality requirement.38 They argue that the need for an 
invention to be an artificially-created state of affairs limits the scope of what can be 
patented to technological innovations and that organisational, business, theoretical or 
scientific innovation as such are not patentable, on the understanding that 
‘technology’ is the practical application of knowledge or a manner of accomplishing a 
task using technical processes, methods or knowledge.39 Thus, the idea of a 
technicality requirement confines patentable subject matter to processes and products 
that have a practical effect, and it excludes unimplemented theoretical knowledge and 
methods. 
 
However, the existence of a technicality requirement does not imply that an invention 
must have a physical aspect to be patentable, as it is possible that an intangible 
product or process may render a practical or technical effect. For example, the 
practical effect in Grant v Commissioner of Patents, assuming that the method is 
effective, is that the asset protection method makes an asset immune from the claims 
of creditors. This is an artificially-created state of affairs which has a practical effect, 
but does not involve a physical aspect. It is not mere theoretical knowledge, such as 
an understanding of how the law operates, but it is the technical implementation of 
that knowledge to achieve a valuable effect that constitutes the invention. 
 
An additional point to consider is the argument that this is not an appropriate patent 
for the patents office to issue. Reasons to support this argument are that it would stifle 
the ability of citizens to engage in what would appear to be fairly routine means of 
structuring financial arrangements, or it would unduly hamper the work of legal 
advisors, who would need to be cognisant of the possibility that they and their clients 
could be infringing a patent by giving or implementing legal advice.  
 
Although patent law necessarily involves finding a balance between competing and 
sometimes conflicting policy considerations, the courts have taken the view that it is 
not their role to entertain these questions when they are deciding whether to uphold a 
patent. Instead, questions of policy are to be determined by the legislature, which does 
so in the terms set out in the Act. For a court to hold that a particular class of 
invention is not patentable on policy grounds would be inconsistent with the approach 
established in this regard by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Anaesthetic 
Supplies Pty Limited v Rescare Limited.40 The Full Court in that case reviewed 
decisions dealing with the manner of manufacture test and methods of treating 
humans and decided that it is the role of Parliament, rather than the courts, to decide 
whether matters of ethics or social policy are to have any impact on what is 
patentable. 
 
                                                 
38 William van Caenegem, ‘The technicality requirement, patent scope and patentable subject matter in 
Australia’ (2002) 13 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 41, 43; Andrew Christie, ‘Some 
Observations on the Requirement of Inherent Patentability in the Context of Business Method Patents’ 
(2000) Intellectual Property Forum 16; Ross McFarlane describes this requirement as a ‘technical or 
tangible environment’ in ‘Business Process Patents’ (2000) 13 Australian Intellectual Property Law 
Bulletin 38, 38. 
39 William van Caenegem, ‘The technicality requirement, patent scope and patentable subject matter in 
Australia’ (2002) 13 Australian Intellectual Property Journal 41, 51 – 52. 
40 (1994) 122 ALR 141 (Lockhart, Sheppard and Wilcox JJ). 
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Lockhart J in commenting on methods of treating human beings, noted: 
 
There is no statutory provision in Australia prohibiting the grant of a patent for 
a process of medical treatment of a human ailment or disease in a human 
being. It is noteworthy that Parliament had the opportunity to exclude methods 
of treating the human body when it enacted the 1990 Act, but the limit of the 
exclusion was s. 18(2), namely: ‘human beings, and the biological processes 
for their generation, are not patentable inventions’.41 
 
Similarly, Wilcox J also commented that Parliament had the opportunity to make 
provisions under the 1990 Act relating to matters of ethics or social policy and chose 
not to. He said: 
 
I find unpersuasive the alternative bases for the exception advanced by some 
judges. They involve matters of ethics and social policy upon which the courts 
have no special expertise. In my opinion, for the courts to resort to any of 
them, in order to engraft onto a recently enacted statute an exception that 
Parliament has chosen not to adopt, would be to usurp that institution’s role.42 
 
Finally, Heerey J in Welcome Real-Time v Catuity made short shrift of these 
arguments when he said in relation to general inconvenience that: 
 
But if an invention otherwise satisfies the requirement of s 18 it can hardly be 
a complaint that others in the relevant field will be restricted in their trade 
because they cannot lawfully infringe the patent. The whole purpose of patent 
law is the granting of monopoly.43 
 
It can be said in respect of Mr Grant’s case that Parliament had the opportunity to 
make provision under the 1990 Patents Act dealing with inventions that lack a 
physical effect and chose not to. Therefore, it is inappropriate for a court to introduce 
an artificial fetter on what may be patentable because it considers the consequence of 
a patent being granted as being undesirable.  
 
A final point worthy of note is that from an Australian perspective, while the broad 
issues raised in Grant v Commissioner of Patents are being considered in other 
jurisdictions, it is not necessarily instructive to look to those other jurisdictions for 
guidance as to how Australian courts should resolve the issue. The reason for this is 
the peculiarity of the Australian test for patentability. While courts in Australia may 
approve of the reasoning in United States decisions, most notably State Street Bank & 
Trust Co v Signature Financial Group, this does not indicate that they consider 
themselves compelled to follow or even consider them. For this reason, consideration 
of decisions from other jurisdictions such as the decision of the Court of Appeal in the 
United Kingdom in Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings Ltd, or the recent debate as to the 
patentability of tax avoidance schemes in the United States, may be of interest, but are 
not necessarily useful for Australian courts deciding matters in accordance with 
domestic law. 
 
                                                 
41 Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Limited v Rescare Limited (1994) 122 ALR 141, 159. 
42 Anaesthetic Supplies Pty Limited v Rescare Limited (1994) 122 ALR 141, 183. 




For these reasons it is suggested that the existing Australian law, set out in the High 
Court’s landmark decision in NRDC and subsequent cases, does not require the 
existence of a physical aspect for an invention to be patentable.  
 
This view will form the basis of a critique of the Full Court’s decision in Grant v 
Commissioner of Patents, in which it sought to read into the existing law a 
requirement that in order to be patentable a method must disclose a physical aspect. 
That critique is contained in part 2, which is a separate article, that evaluates the 
approaches taken in Grant v Commissioner of Patents by the Deputy Commissioner 
of Patents, Branson J, and by the Full Court of the Federal Court, all of whom held 
that the asset protection method is not a patentable invention. A particular focus is 
given to the Full Court’s decision and its interpretation of the existing law, before an 
overview of the issues that the High Court might consider if it hears the matter on 
appeal is set out. 
 
